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Abstract 
Currently, the predominant pricing plan for the 
search engine (SE) advertising services in a 
proprietary electronic market is a flat fee (FF) pricing. 
These services have faced the challenge of customer 
attrition recently since FF pricing results in the 
inequality of service surplus among subscribers. A 
more sustainable and profitable pricing model would 
be to distinguish advertising resources by providing 
an additional usage-based pricing for certain user 
groups to transfer the service surplus among 
subscribers. We conceive a hybrid model integrating 
Pay-Per-Click (PPC) pricing into FF pricing. This 
proposed scheme can offer an incentive-compatible 
mechanism to attract more subscribers by relieving 
the inequity of service surplus, and eventually result 
in the increasing revenue of service providers. 
 
Keywords: search engine marketing; proprietary 
search engine; flat fee; incentive-compatible 
mechanism; pricing model; market efficiency 
1. Introduction 
Over the last 30 years, e-commerce has been 
booming with the widespread Internet usage.  
Forrester predicts that the U.S. e-commerce market 
will increase from $176.9 billion in 2010 to $229.1 
billion in 2013 [1]. The fast growing e-commerce has 
reinforced the online advertising. Among various 
online advertising channels, search engine marketing 
(SEM), aimed at promoting websites by increasing 
their visibility in search listings, is mounting rather 
quicker than others [2]. According to the Sixth 
Annual State of Search Engine Marketing Report by 
Search Engine Marketing Professional Organization 
(SEMPO), the SEM industry in North American is 
likely to grow 14%, from $14.6 billion in 2009 to 
$16.6 billion by the end of 2010 [3], while this figure 
is projected to only about $4.1 billion in 2003 [4]. 
Today, the top three SEM suppliers in the world are 
Google AdWords, Microsoft adCenter, and Yahoo! 
Search Marketing. 
There are two types of SEM, public SEM and 
internal SEM for proprietary electronic markets. The 
public SEM is publicly accessible without requesting 
a membership (see Table 1), for example, Google 
AdWords. The public SEM is well accepted and has 
matured. For example, Google’s total advertising 
revenues were $21,129 million in 2008 and grew at 
8% in 2009 to hit $22,889 million [5]. The internal 
SEM is the kind of information services available in 
a proprietary electronic market and operated by the 
market provider mainly for product information 
dissemination. The examples can be found in various 
forms of electronic markets, such as, eBay 
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(Consumer-to-Consumer), Amazon 
(Business-to-Consumer), and Alibaba 
(Business-to-Business).  
 
Table 1. A Comparison between public SEM and 
internal SEM  
(Source: Novak and Hoffman 2000 [6]) 
Aspects Public SEM Internal SEM 
Relationship 
to the market 
Any electronic 
market 
A proprietary 
electronic market 
Service 
independency 
Independence Incorporating into 
Member Services 
Content & 
structure 
Broad, varied 
information 
types and 
content 
Structured around 
products and 
services 
Pricing 
policy 
Pay-Per-Click 
underpinned by 
keyword 
auction 
Flat Fee (FF)  
Client Any potential 
advertisers  
Suppliers in the 
electronic market 
Audience All Internet 
users 
Specific target 
segments of 
potential 
customers 
Utility of 
click 
(conversion 
rate) 
Low High  
The ability to 
measure the 
utility of 
search engine 
advertising  
Disability of 
measuring and 
tracking visits 
and uses of 
customers 
Ability of 
measuring and 
tracking visits and 
uses of customers 
for activities on 
this platform  
Research 
status 
Mature stage Preliminary stage 
 
Internal SEM has formed a particular advertising 
market. We denote this advertising market as search 
engine advertising market (SEAM). The public 
SEAM denotes the advertising market belonging to 
public search engine, such as Google. The products 
in a SEAM are various search engine (SE) 
advertising services. The clients are the suppliers in 
the primary electronic market who are selling their 
products. They are potential buyers of the advertising 
resources. They have two levels of status in the 
SEAM: product supplier (everyone has this status), 
and subscriber of SE advertising services (service fee 
payer). The advertising resources are the clicks of the 
primary market visitors. 
There is a wide range of pricing models to finance 
SE advertising services, including pay-per-click 
(PPC), pay-per-action (PPA), pay-per-lead (PPL), 
pay-per-purchase (PPP), and so on. Among these 
pricing models, the PPC model, underpinned by the 
keyword biding mechanism, is widely adopted in the 
public SEAM. The advertiser pays when a user clicks 
on its advertisement and visits its site. However, the 
PPC pricing model is open to abuse by click fraud, 
although rising sophisticated means of detection are 
used. In July 2006, Google settled a class-action 
lawsuit for $90 million fund since plaintiffs 
alleging it did not do enough to prevent click fraud 
[7]. For another, the advertiser takes the risk of the 
conversion rate from a casual click, a visit to an 
actual sale in PPC campaign. However, the internal 
SEM releases those issues for its special 
characteristics (see Table 1).  
The SE advertising services in a SEAM is an 
important portion in a premium customizable 
package for the subscribers in a proprietary 
electronic market. Normally the provider of the 
market adopts the flat fee (FF) pricing model to 
finance their services. FF pricing model, the earliest 
Web advertising pricing model, is a fixed price for a 
given period of time as paid inclusion in a SEAM, 
for example, the annual membership fee. Because FF 
ignores volumes of the usage/traffic (the amount of 
individuals who visit a site), it fails to differentiate 
SE advertising services for users. This reduces the 
efficiency of the SEAM.  
The motivation that we look into the pricing 
problem in the SEAM is triggered by the issue raised 
in Alibaba’s B2B market, regarding the efficiency of 
the FF pricing model adopted by the company. 
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Alibaba Group, started in Hangzhou, China, in 1999, 
is a leading electronic marketplace assembling 
business to business (B2B) international trade, online 
retail and payment platforms and data-centric cloud 
computing services. Alibaba Group consists of 
Alibaba.com (B2B), Taobao.com (C2C), Alipay (a 
third-party electronic payment service provider), 
Alibaba Cloud Computing, and Yahoo! China. By 
mid 2010, it has nearly 18,000 employees in more 
than 60 cities in China, plus a few other oversea 
subsidiaries at the US, Japan, UK, and Singapore [8]. 
Recently, Alibaba B2B has received complaints from 
its e-market subscribers because the number of 
inquiries or feedbacks some subscribers received did 
not bring enough benefit to compensate the cost of 
annual membership fee. As a result, they may 
unsubscribe from the SEAM after current billing 
cycle. This raises the issue how to optimize the 
allocation of the limited advertising resources among 
subscribers. Could an incentive-compatible pricing 
model be incorporated into current pricing scheme, 
such as PPC? What is the impact of this new scheme 
on current subscribers in the SEAM? These are the 
problems that this paper is intended to tackle.  
This paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we 
present relevant research background and research 
efforts in this field. We analyze the inefficiency of 
current FF pricing scheme in the SEAM in section 3. 
In section 4, we conceive a hybrid pricing model by 
incorporating PPC pricing into FF pricing, and 
explain the efficiency of the proposed new pricing 
plan. We present the limitation of our proposed 
model and future research works in section 5. 
2. Relevant Background and Research 
Work 
2.1 Alibaba’s TrustPass program – the Internal 
SE Advertising Services 
It is more illustrative that we look into the case of 
Alibaba as an example. Alibaba’s TrustPass program, 
launched in 2002, includes a paid SE advertising 
services for suppliers in its B2B electronic market. 
After paying the annual fee, TrustPass subscribers 
have opportunities to be ranked in a good place in a 
search engine result list. Figure 1 displays a screen 
shot with search results in Alibaba’ internal SE. The 
main difference between an internal SE and a public 
SE is that the former only provides one set of search 
results, while the latter delivers a set of organic 
search results and another set of sponsored search 
results. Products of more competent subscribers 
usually rank top places and hence receive more 
inquiries from potential customers than less 
competent subscribers. This situation leads to the 
Matthew Effect (the rich get richer and the poor get 
poorer) - the competent subscribers have better 
chances to be exposed in the market with more 
opportunities, and hence more budget for advertising. 
As a result, those less competent subscribers will 
unsubscribe TrustPass. This implies the decline of 
revenue for Alibaba. Therefore, improving the 
market mechanism is critic. 
Figure 1： Search Results for Search Term “mobile phone” in Alibaba.com internal SE
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2.2 Relevant Research Efforts 
Sen et al summarize five major sources of 
revenues for SE as of paid inclusion, paid submission, 
content promotion, keyword-linked banner 
advertisements, and paid placement [9]. Paid 
inclusion is a campaign that guarantees products to 
list pages in the main search results. Paid Placement 
is guaranteed a high ranking, usually in relation to 
desired search keywords with a particular position.   
The FF pricing reduces risks and administrative 
costs for service providers, and provides predictable 
fee for advertisers. Referring to the definition by Sen 
et al, the FF pricing used by the SEAM is for paid 
inclusion, but different from the FF scheme for paid 
placement in Sen et al. However, the FF scheme is 
not incentive-compatible, causing the same public 
good problem as those services free of charge.  
Thus far, the inefficiency of FF pricing in network 
services has been well-studied in last fifteen years 
(see McKnight and Boroumand 2000, Lin et al 2002) 
[10] [11]. Novak et al discuss the challenge of FF 
pricing that fails to demonstrate to the advertisers the 
value of their advertising expenditures [6]. Hoffman 
and Novak (2002) introduce a CDnow case to present 
the trend that per-click pricing and pay for 
performance displace the traditional impression 
model in Internet advertising marketing [12]. 
McKnighta and Boroumand discuss the inefficiency 
of FF pricing for internet services and propose new 
service pricing models [10]. Lin et al explore a 
virtual private network (VPN) traffic pricing model. 
The proposed pricing mechanism can effectively 
promote a VPN's transmission efficiency in the 
service welfare rate based on their experiment [11]. 
Odlyzko discusses Paris metro system with 
differentiated services in the prices as traffic 
management to accommodate user preferences at the 
cost of utilization efficiency of the network [13]. 
Altmann and Chu discuss the efficiency of purely FF 
pricing and the challenge of per-minute pricing plans 
in network services, and propose more flexible 
pricing plans providing access to the Internet via FF 
pricing based services and charging for extra demand 
based on usage [14]. Sundararaja suggests that firms 
should transform from low fixed-fee penetration 
pricing in nascent information market to an optimal 
pricing mix including usage-based pricing options as 
these markets mature [15].  
In another aspect, some related works discuss the 
influential factors for revenue maximizing of SEM, 
such as clicks, performance of products and ranks. 
Hoffman and Novak (2000) analyze and compare 
advertising models on the Internet [6]. Chatterjee and 
Hoffman model the commercial “clickstream” at an 
advertiser supported Web site to predict consumers 
interacting with advertising stimuli [2]. Weber and 
Zheng design a two-stage model of search 
intermediaries and find that profit-maximizing search 
engine design is its rankings considering both 
product performance and bid amount [16]. Feng et al 
discuss that the performance of several mechanisms 
for allocating sponsored slots depending on the 
degree of correlation between suppliers’ willingness 
to pay and their relevance to the search term [17]. 
Ghose and Yang use a hierarchical Bayesian 
modeling framework to quantify the relationship 
between different sponsored search metrics [18].   
3. The Inefficiency of the Flat Fee 
Scheme in Internal SE Advertising 
The inefficiency problem in the internal SE 
advertising pricing is similar to the problem in a 
public good market but with its own specialties. For 
example, the annual fee for Alibaba’s TrustPass 
covers other member services except SE advertising 
services. As usual, the FF pricing model results in 
inequality of service surplus among Alibaba’s 
subscribers. Those better benefited take away others’ 
and eventually reduce the number of subscribers. 
Because of limited advertising resources, a SEAM is 
a seller market with limited counts of clicks available 
in a given time period [19]. In a public SEAM, the 
use of the advertising resources is based on the 
competing price and the market is generally efficient. 
We are to use a mathematic model to study the 
problem of current FF pricing scheme in a SEAM.   
Let all advertising resources in a SEAM be A, 
which is the total number of clicks in a given time 
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period. Denote N as the number of suppliers needing 
the internal SE advertising services to promote their 
businesses. However, only up to M of them, M < N, 
will possibly be allocated enough advertising 
resources to receive none negative net benefit. They 
pay a FF rate r for the service in a given period. 
Therefore, the FF revenue R of the SEAM provider is 
determined by the number of subscribers and annual 
fee, i.e.  
R  =  M * r                         (1) 
We call this market clearing status as the primitive 
status. Obviously, the primitive status is impossible 
because the subscribers of the internal SE advertising 
service are diversified regarding their competences in 
taking advantage of the service after entering the 
SEAM by paying a fixed fee. Those having a better 
strategy and being more competence may consume 
more advertising resources with more clicks. This 
leaves the less competent subscribers less likely to be 
listed in search results since the search result slots are 
the scarce resource on search engines.  
Keep M as the maximum number of subscribers 
who share the internal SE advertising resources, and 
M’ as the actual number of the subscribers who are 
willing to stay in the SEAM. Let  be the competent 
level of subscribers in the SEAM. We assume that  
is uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. A subscriber i  {1, 
M} has a competent level i. Subscriber i’s decision 
to maintain his membership is justified by the profit 
function: 
i = Q(i) = hi + Si(ci (i), vi(i)) – r    (2) 
s.t. i=1
M
 vi  A 
Where 
hi – the benefit from other services rather than 
internal SE advertising service.    
Si – the benefit from internal SE advertising 
service.  
ci – the conversion rate of the subscriber, which is 
determined by the competent level of subscribers. 
vi – the number of clicks that the subscriber 
receives in a service billing cycle. The competent 
level of subscribers determines their amount of 
clicks. 
If i <0, subscribers will be likely to unsubscribe 
from the SEAM after current billing cycle. The total 
number of subscribers who make non-negative profit 
is M’, which is less than M. From the analysis, the 
capacity related factor  determines M’. If the 
number of subscribers reduces from M to M’, the 
internal SE advertising provider’s actual revenue 
becomes  
R’ = M’ * r < R                        (3) 
Figure 2 presents two charts for better illustrating 
the above models. Without loosing their intuition, 
these simplified charts assume that subscribers are 
identical except their competent levels. We can see 
that, the ABC is the negative benefit for a certain 
subscribers group, the inequality of click resources 
allocation due to competent levels results in only M’ 
< M subscribers have positive surplus of the service.  
Figure 2: The inequality of the SEAM service reduces the number of subscribers 
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4. Hybrid SE Advertising Service Pricing 
Figure 2 has hinted us that if we can exploit the positive 
surplus from those more competent subscribers to 
compensate those having a negative profit, it could make 
more subscribers receiving a positive profit from the 
SEAM. A general approach for this is the 
incentive-compatible mechanism by usage-based pricing 
[11]. This idea is not new. For example, the PPC with 
keyword auction in current public SEAM is a good case. 
The challenge of the SEAM in a proprietary electronic 
market is how to adopt the incentive-compatible 
mechanism while maintaining the original FF scheme for 
other kinds of services besides SEM. In order to deal with 
this problem, we conceive a hybrid revenue model by 
incorporating a PPC model into the FF model, instead of 
completely giving up FF scheme. According to our model, 
since the click is directly relevant to the revenue of 
subscribers from the SEAM, the SE advertising providers 
will charge a fixed price per click from subscribers who 
consume extra clicks than a certain threshold. This way 
increases the revenue of SE advertising providers by 
differentiating advertising resources and investments of 
subscribers in the SEAM, meanwhile relieves excess 
surplus due to original FF scheme for these more 
competent subscribers. At the same time, the SE 
advertising provider will compensate a fixed price per 
click for subscribers who received lower clicks than a 
certain threshold. We expect that the revenue of the 
subscribers with low gross benefit exceeds their cost via 
compensation. As a result, those may renew the SE 
advertising service in the next period, and remain in the 
SEAM. The increasing number of subscribers amplifies 
the revenue of SE advertising providers. 
In fact, although our compensation mechanism is based 
on the counts of clicks, the benefit from the clicks in the 
SEAM distinguishes among subscribers. There are two 
factors determining the utility of each click. One is the 
conversion rate from clicks to transactions. Another is the 
profit of each transaction for different subscribers. The 
conversion rate relies on the competent level of subscribers 
to optimize their websites and promote their services for 
consumers. The efficiency of each transaction for 
subscribers depends on the product performance and 
goods traded in one transaction. For example, there are 
two subscribers, A and B. For one tranaction, A sells 1000 
LV bags and each package worth $1000. B just sells one 
bag and the bag worth $100. Thus, A can gain higher profit 
from a deal than B. Based on our model, A can gain a 
higher profit from each click.  
Therefore, although the hybrid pricing scheme can 
increase the number of subscribers via compensation 
mechanism, it is hard to achieve all M potential 
subscribers considering the efficiency of compensation. In 
the compensation mechanism relying on the counts of 
clicks, some subscribers receive the surplus from the 
compensation, and other subscribers might not achieve 
enough compensation to make up for their cost so they still 
unsubscribe from the SEAM. Similarly, after the SE 
advertising provider charges fee from these more 
competent subscribers having the same clicks, their service 
surplus is different regarding the utilities of clicks. 
Figure 3: the benefit of subscribers in the hybrid pricing model 
Figure 3 presents a chart to illustrate this intuition. 
The area AB’C’ is the total compensation from SE 
advertising providers. From the illustrative chart, we 
notice, with the compensation, the benefits of a part 
of subscribers with lower clicks are higher than the 
cost, and others are lower than the cost. The 
wave-like edge of the charge and compensation is 
due to utilities of clicks for subscribers because the 
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same number of clicks may be related to different 
levels of conversion rates or different utilities of 
transactions. 
 
A basic setting for the hybrid scheme: 
Now, the revenue structure of the SE advertising 
provider contains three additional portions from 
Eq.(3): the revenue from PPC incomes, Rc, the costs 
for the compensation for the subscribers with low 
clicks, L, and the extra subscribers’ fees from those 
having low clicks but benefited by the new 
promotion policy, R. The total revenue of internal 
SE advertising is  
R” = R’ + Rc – L + R                    (4) 
Let the threshold of charging a high-click fee be vH, 
the threshold of paying back a low-click 
compensation be vL, the per-click-based extra charge 
for high-click subscribers be qH, and the 
per-click-based low-click compensation be qL We 
have 
Rc = j=1
N
 qH [(vj – vH) + |vj – vH|] / 2        (5) 
L = j=1
N
 qL [(vL – vj) + |vL – vj|] / 2        (6) 
R = (M” – M’) * r                      (7) 
where M” > M’ is the number of subscribers who 
have non-negative profit from the new mechanism. It 
is obvious we must set vH  vL. 
The above indicates that the SE advertising 
provider needs to deal with the tradeoff between the 
revenue of PPC campaign, Rc, extra subscribers fees, 
R, and the compensation, L. Although the 
compensation seizes a part of total revenue from the 
SE advertising provider, the compensation 
mechanism expands the number of subscribers 
compared with original FF pricing model. In return, 
the increasing number of subscribers amplifies the 
revenue of the extra subscribers’ fees. The direct 
revenue increases of PPC and extra subscribers’ fee, 
and the loss of revenue due to compensation 
mechanism simultaneously impact on the total 
revenue of the SE advertising provider.  
Figure 4 shows an illustrative chart to present the 
change of revenue from original FF pricing model to 
the new hybrid pricing model. Though the 
compensation for special subscribers reduces the 
total revenue, the incremental number of subscribers 
promotes the total revenue.  
Now, the subscriber j’s profits function of SE 
advertising service from the hybrid pricing scheme: 
j = Q (j, vL, vH, qL, qH) = hj + Sj (cj(j), vj(j)) – qH 
[(vj – vH) + |vj – vH|] / 2 + qL [(vL – vj) + |vL – vj|] / 2 
– r                                     (8) 
s.t. j=1
M
 vj  A 
 
The profits function for the subscribers having a 
positive profit in the FF pricing scheme: 
j = Q (j, vL, vH, qL, qH) = hi + Sj (cj(j), vj(j)) – 
qH [(vj – vH) + |vj – vH|] / 2 – r               (8)’ 
The profits function for the subscribers having a 
negative profit in the FF pricing scheme: 
j = Q (j, vL, vH, qL, qH) = hj + Sj (cj(j), vj(j)) + 
qL [(vL – vj) + |vL – vj|] / 2 – r            (8)” 
 
Since the number of clicks is observable in the 
SEAM, properly choosing vH, and qH can always 
maintain a positive profit level for those affected 
subscribers. Hence an SE advertising provider will 
have a positive Rc to fund L for the compensation 
expenses. Similarly, properly choosing vL, and qL can 
always help those low-click subscribers to earn a 
positive profit. This will eventually result in a 
positive R. In this way, the hybrid pricing scheme is 
superior to the FF pricing scheme. 
Figure 4: the comparison of the total revenue between the hybrid pricing model and the FF scheme 
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5. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the effect of pricing schemes for 
the SE advertising service in the proprietary SEAM. The 
FF scheme fails to differ services in the SEAM and results 
in inequality of service surplus among subscribers. This 
eventually reduces the number of subscribers. The 
proposed hybrid SE service pricing scheme incorporates 
the PPC pricing model into the FF pricing scheme. It 
provides certain incentive-compatible mechanism to attract 
more subscribers to the SE advertising service in the 
SEAM.  
As an analytical model, the hybrid model has its 
limitation. We treat the efficiency of each click of different 
subscribers without distinction. Thus, the proposed 
incentive-compatible mechanism might not encourage all 
of the subscribers in the SEAM.     
Several avenues present for future research. First, we 
may distinguish the efficiency of clicks for different 
subscribers, including conversion rate and the utilities of 
different transactions. If so, the proposed model would be 
better to encourage the subscribers in the SEAM through 
avoiding under-compensation and overcompensation. 
Second, we will analyze the implementation of the hybrid 
pricing strategies for the SEAM via computational 
stimulations after completing the relevant math model. 
Laboratory experiments will determine the concrete 
strategies of SE compensation and PPC pricing for 
subscribers in the proposed model. Laboratory will find the 
optimized situation in the hybrid pricing model for revenue 
of the SEAM.      
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